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Abstract 
Malpractices have over time been prevalent in the Nations’ banking industry. Malpractices are those Practices 
which are not only contrary to the ethics of the banking profession, but that also constitute infringements of 
various banking laws and regulations. This paper discusses the various malpractices common to the Nigerian 
banking industry and the ways the laws had combated these. 
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1. Introduction 
The banking industry constitutes one of the pillars on which the economy of any nation can be erected. The 
banking sector is the grease that lubricates the economic machine of any nation. One thing is however certain, 
when the banking industry sneezes, the entire nation catches cold. The attitude or adroitness of a nation’s 
banking sector plays a significant part in its balance of payments fortunes or misfortunes. It is in view of all these 
that the maintenance of the integrity of the banking sector should be of great concern to any government and 
indeed the international community. This is why this paper campaigns against malpractices in the banking 
industry. 
Although criminal acts and other malpractices are not peculiar to the banking sector alone, indeed what 
is commonly referred to as “white collar” criminality permeates all facets of commercial activities. One must 
hasten to add that the greatest manifestation of “white collar” criminality is in the banking or bank related 
activities. In any case, the chain of criminal exploits is hardly ever completed without the involvement of the 
banking sector. The thrust of this paper is to discuss the problem of malpractices in the Nigerian banking 
industry and examine how the laws have been able to combat these; appropriate recommendations would also be 
made.  
 
1.1. Malpractices in the Banking Industry  
Malpractices can be divided into three broad categories namely:
1
  
(a)  Malpractices by Bank Employees,  
(b) Malpractices by Non – Employees of the Banks and  
(c)  Malpractices by Banks themselves 
  
2. Malpractices by Bank Employees  
Bank employees malpractices are mainly practices perpetrated by bank employees against interests of their 
banks/employers or the customers of the banks, solely for the benefits of themselves (the employees), or for the 
joint benefits of themselves and their outside collaborators, such malpractices include stealing of bank's monies, 
stealing of customers monies, falsification of accounts and forgery of bank papers for the purposes of stealing or 
in order to corruptly enrich themselves, or deliberately breaching banking rules to make money for themselves or 
for such other reasons. 
 
2.1. Stealing of Bank’s Monies
2
:  
 This includes stealing by customers, stealing from cashiers by other employees, and stealing by other employees 
of higher rank, up to the managerial level. This type of stealing may be committed by cashiers from their daily 
receipts, or it can be committed by other employees who steal from monies in the custody of cashiers, who may 
be momentarily absent from their cages without locking them up. While managerial stealing may be committed 
in so many ways, including stealing money from the strong-room, money with forged currency roles.
3
  
However, the most baneful of this act of theft is now done by fraudulent transfers of bank funds from 
one bank to the other. Such fraudulent transfers are now considerably aided by the use of telexes and computers.
4
 
                                                           
 
1 Adedokun Adeyemi,(1990) “Malpractices in the Banking Industry”; in Banking and   Other Financial 
Malpractices in Nigeria, Fed. Ministry of Justice Law Review   Series, p.14 
2 Adedokun Adeyemi Op.cit. 
3 See  Aeroflot(Soviet Airlines) V United Bank for Africa (1986) 3 NWLR 188 
4 See Adedokun Adeyemi, (1989) “Malpractices in the Banking Industry”;Being 
a paper presented at the Seminar on Banking  and Other Financial Malpractices, held  
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This practice usually involves collusion by employees, of, at least, two banks. An example of this practice is that 
a certain amount of money goes out from Bank A, requesting Bank B to transfer a certain amount of money from 
a customer X's account in Bank B, on the purported authority of customer X. Everything about the procedures of 
the exchanges between the two banks is regular except the fact that customer X never requested for the transfer 
of money to Bank A in the first place. Often times, a forged request form or letter is prepared to authenticate the 
basis for the action in Bank A. Bank B then responds eventually by effecting the transfer of the requested 
amount to Bank A. The culprit thereafter effects a fake payment to customer X, through the clearance of a forged 
cheque or through the transfer of the funds to yet another bank, Bank C, again supported by false 
documentation. The money is then taken out' from Bank C. On the completion of the operation, the documents 
are then made to disappear from the coffers of Bank A, and possible also, from those of one or both of Banks B. 
& C. An actual, usually impecunious, "customer X", or an outsider, posing as customer X, may be involved in 
the fraudulent transfer operations. Such Inter-bank fraudulent transfers are now becoming frequent in the area of 
international transfers, involving foreign exchange transfers, which are now resulting, not only in losses to 
Nigerian banks in Naira, but also losses to the country in relation to its foreign exchange holdings, quite apart 
from the fact that it is adding to an already bad international reputation for the country. 
 
2.2.Defalcation: - Defalcation of customer's deposits either by conversion or fraudulent alteration of 
deposit vouchers by either the bank cashier or customer's agent is another form of fraud. The case of Lippit v 
Ashley
1
 centered on an action by a receiver against directors of a bank that failed as a result of defalcation by its 
treasurer. Where the bank cashier and customer’s representative collude to defalcate, such frauds are usually 
neatly perpetrated and take longer time to uncover. They are in most cases discovered by customers during 
reconciliation of their bank statements.  
 
2.3. Stealing of Customers Monies
2
:- This can be through simple or complicated methods. Instance of simple 
methods may be where a customer pays money into a bank and the cashier counting the money drops same 
money into his till from a packet, and then claims that the packet of, say N2, 000 in N20 notes, is short by about 
fifteen pieces that is by N300.00. The unsuspecting customer then begins to doubt in his own calculation or 
counting, or honesty of his staff or members of his family who assisted him in counting the money. The reverse 
situation may again occur in the case of withdrawal of money by a regular customer who believes in  the honesty 
and/ or infallibility of banking staff or one who is in a hurry. Here the cashier may short-count the money. Once 
the customer fails to count the money immediately in receipt of the money in the presence and in full view of the 
cashier, he himself will hardly be able to come back to claim the short fall successfully from the cashier of the 
bank. Sometimes the situation occurs in the course of the payment of large sums to big customers, usually 
companies, government departments or parastatals, where some few packets may have minor shortfalls, like one 
N20 out of N2, 000 packets of N20 notes.  
The complicated instances may range from fraudulent intra-bank crediting and debiting of respective 
customer’s accounts, with a view to transferring money from one account to the other form. Which arrangements 
have been made to take money out, to the procedures of fraudulent inter-bank transfers discussed earlier, with 
the difference that the objectives is to get at money kept in a customer's account. The same way may also be 
achieved through the passage of a forged  cheque which, more often than not, usually involves collusion with 
non-banking officials, like the staff of the customer whose cheque is forged.  
 
2.4 Falsification of Accounts and Forgeries for Stealing purposes
3
:- For instance, customer A, who has very 
little funds in his  account, approaches or is approached by staff X of the bank. They agree that a certain amount, 
say about NI00, 000 be transferred from an account of customer B, which has a balance of N789, 000. The 
purpose of the withdrawal is to use the money for some business. After the business they hope to return the NI00, 
000 to customer B's account, and split the profit. During the period of transaction, arrangement is usually made 
to prevent the Statement of Account from being sent to customer B, or fake ones, not reflecting the withdrawal, 
are usually arranged to be sent to him. The withdrawal itself is reflected as follows: The ledger of customer B's 
account is simply debited to the tune of NI00, 000, whilst customer A's account is simultaneously credited to the 
tune of NI00, 000 the same day. At the close of banking transactions for the day the bank records a balanced 
account.  A few days later, customer A gives an order for transfer of the NI00, 000 to another bank, or he 
instructs the bank to prepare a draft to the tune of NI00,000. The money now available in the case of customer 
A's used for whatever business contemplated. At the end of it, customer A pays NI00,000 back into his account. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
at the Institute of International affairs, Victoria Island, Lagos, 24-26 April 
1 94A, 995 (Comm. 1915)  
2 Op. Cit., p.16  
3  Adedokun Adeyemi Op.cit. pp .16-17 
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That very day or some days later, his account is debited, through an entry on his account ledger, to the tune of 
NI00,000 whilst the account of customer B is credited to the tune of NI00,000 , that very same day. Again, at the 
close of banking transactions on that day, the bank again achieves a balanced account. The debiting and crediting 
and the subsequent reversals, are simply explained off as machine or  computer errors.  
 
2.5. Corruption 
There are two broad categories of corruption among banking officials  namely:-  
(a) Corruption involving falsification of accounts and other documents.  
(b) Corruption involving breaches of banking rules.  
In either case it is with the view to highly placed banking officials rewarding themselves, their wives, 
relations, girl-friends, friends or some other persons in position of authority. Quite apart from falsifying accounts 
and other documents for purposes of stealing money from the banks or their customers, bank officials also use 
the same methods for other fraudulent purposes. For example, in order to back up illegal transfer of foreign 
exchange, bank officials, in collusion with custom officials and the Nigerian Ports Authority officials, conspire 
with certain customers to prepare letters of credit for unimported goods, or for an amount considerably than 
(may be ten times) the actual amount of goods actually ordered and imported into the country. All banking 
documents, customs documents and the Ports Authority documents are false or entirely fake. 
In the case of UBA Ltd . v Ibhafidon
1
   a Nigerian Case..The appellant gave some money to a man in 
the presence of the bank official. This money was not in order to purchase some foreign exchange from the 
man’s domiciliary account. The bank asked him to return the next day to collect the money. On getting to the 
bank he was informed that he could not collect the money as there were insufficient funds in the man's account 
and that the funds in the account were from a forged cheque. This was in contravention of Foreign Currency 
(Domiciliary Account) Act of 1986, which forbids transactions in foreign exchange other than with an 
unauthorized dealer. The court upheld this and said all transactions involving foreign exchange are to be done in 
accordance with the existing laws; any transactions in breach of these laws are illegal. In the case of non-
observance of rules this related largely to areas of loans, there, for a particular percentage share of the loan, the 
manager may decide to grant a loan exceeding his authority, without reference to the appropriate headquarters 
for approval. Again he may even grant the loan without adequate or, even any collateral at all. Also there are 
instances of bank managers granting unlimited overdraft facilities to their wives, girl friends, relations or other 
friends, to trade with, or without any collateral at all.  
Other   malpractices by bank staff include suppression of cheques in clearing, interception of telex 
messages meant for transfer of funds under international commercial, and other transactions with the object of 
diverting the proceeds into their own foreign accounts
2
  
   
3. Malpractice by Non-Employee of Banks
3
  
These categories of persons also, engage or participate in the commission of these crimes. The area which the 
Nigerian banks now watch out for is the area of computer transfer. Banks and law enforcement authorities at 
present do not know enough about the incidence of computer frauds in practice. Through the use of computer 
terminal at one branch of a bank or the other, the sort of fraudulent transfers discussed above are now more 
readily facilitated by computer, whereby it is now possible for a branch to lock in into the computer control 
database or of another branch (or even from one bank computer to another bank's computer) and programme that 
other branch's or banks computer to transfer money from the account(s) into designated account(s) at the 
originating bank branch or ,elsewhere. Hence the banks need adequate training for their staff about building a lot 
of security checks into their computer systems, and carefully guarding same. This will involve letting the general 
staff have access only to the routine of the packaging system, whilst the secret codes for the security 
checks/guards should be known only to the managing director and one or two of his top', aides' or to the  
computer operations top cadre (not more than two or three in number). Such people must have bear full 
responsibility for computer operations in their banks.  
They should, of course periodically test their systems for security leakages, and change their code's 
where leakages have been discovered or suspected. It is essential and urgent for our banks to take sewing 
precautions in this area, bearing in mind that computers now operate via satellite, so telecommunications 
transmissions have demonstrated. The implication of this is that a very competent foreign resident computer 
scientist can induce transfer of frauds from any of our banks via satellite at will, unless adequate care is taken. 
The prospects of this must be quite frightful for a developing country like Nigeria. 
Also, it is common knowledge that confidence tricksters, fake business men and women, as well as 
                                                           
1 (1994) 4 NWLR (PT 318) p.91.  
2 See I.J. Goldface- Irolikabe (2007) Law of Banking in Nigeria, Lagos: Malthouse Law Books , p.180 
3 Adedokun Adeyemi Op.cit. 
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port agents, produce forged letters of credits, and  spurious bank drafts purportedly issued by Nigerian banks 
with the  aim of receiving large consignments of goods and other supplies from overseas manufactures and 
traders which are never paid for.
1
 Similar to this is the practice of printing bank’s stationery, carving bank rubber 
stamp , and use of fake letter headed paper.
2
 
 
3.1. Money Laundering  
This falls under fraud committed by non-bank employees. One of the  greatest problems that were encountered 
by Nigeria was money laundering. The Nigerian Money Laundering Decree No. 38 1995 does not define money  
laundering, what it does is to criminalize money-laundering activities and make such activity triable. Money 
Laundering involves putting ill-gotten money into the banking system. This type of money was got from money 
scams (popularly called "419" which has been identified with S.419 of the Criminal Code of Nigeria, this section 
deals with obtaining by false pretence which has blurred the image of the country internationally. This is the 
primary focus of the law enforcement, legislative and regulating bodies. When this occurs, the evidence of this 
transaction is  adulterated or eliminated so the origin of the transaction cannot be traced. 
Money laundering has always been about concealing the proceeds of  organised crime. Criminals of 
every kind through traffickers, smugglers, illicit arm dealers, corrupt officials - must find ways to launder the 
money flowing from their crimes.
3
 They want their ill-gotten gains to look legitimate so they don't come under 
the prying eyes of law enforcement agencies. And one' way they clean this dirt is to move it around the world's 
financial systems
4
 .  
Money laundering and terrorism financing have several similarities. Both are secretive financial 
activities on a global scale. But terrorism financing differs from usual money laundering patterns because it 
includes legal, as well as illegal sources of funds, so for terrorism financing we need to look for clean money 
being used for dirty purposes, as well as dirty money that is been cleansed
5
. A recent case in Hong Kong also 
highlights how other illicit commodities can be used. Three people were extradited from Hong Kong to San 
Diego in March for allegedly trying to sell drugs to buy missiles from Talibam
6
.  
 
3.2. Electronic Fraud  
Electronic Fraud is a term applied to all cases of fraud involving the computer system. It covers all sorts of 
abuses ranging from malicious damage to data, outright theft of data, unauthorized amendments for tampering 
with the programme, unlawful access to the system, willful damage to computing resources, denial 
of access to authorized user and removal of protection feautures
7
. In fact, fraud is today seen as a fast growing 
"Industry" of its own and the advent of information on technology obviously facilitates and accelerates the 
growth. Security is obviously a key challenge in the evolving electronic culture
8
 . The problem transcends both 
geographical barriers and level of sophistication of various economics. For instance, fraudsters in recent past 
broke into the computer system of the Federal Bureau of the investigation (FBI) in the United States of  
America., one of the most protected  systems in the world, such development have given organizations and 
governments serious cause for concern about their secrets. 
3.2.1. Nature of Electronic Fraud  
The most common types of electronic fraud perpetrated in the banking system include  
(a) Manipulation of the computer, including theft of information.  
A very sizeable percentage of cases of fraud that often occur in computer environments usually come under 
manipulation of the computer and theft of information. This may entail manipulation of the hardware, 
manipulation of computer programmes and the processing of unauthorized data. Cases of fraudsters feeding 
fictitious data into the computer are also common. Programme manipulation is equally a very common aspect of 
computer fraud and this is usually perpetrated by smart processing staff. For instance, the update of programme 
for savings account can be manipulated in such a way that a percentage of interest due on some accounts with 
large balances are credited to some unrelated customers accounts.  
                                                           
1 I.bid at  p.181 
2 ibid 
3Natasa Cveticanin, (2002) “Money Laundering in Yugoslavia” In International   Business Lawyer, Volume 30, NO. 30, 
November 
4 Ms Clarie Lo,(2003) Commissioner for Nareotics,.MoneyLaun dering and fight against Terrorism :Hongkong Perspective, 
MS Clarrie Lo, National Press Club, 
Washington D.C. Friday, June 13 
5 ibid 
6 ibid 
7 Esan Ogunleye, (2001) “Fraud and Electronic Banking: Avoiding Pitfalls”, Modus 
International Law & Business Quarterly, Vol. 6, p.23. 
8 ibid 
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(b)  Physical Attack:- Computer hardware with the programmes and data files can be willfully destroyed by a 
fraudulent and mischievous staff. This may be done to cure any traces of fraudulent practices perpetrated by 
fraudster.  
(c) Misuse of Computer resources:- This usually occurs through unauthorized use of the computer, the 
programme or data files. The perpetrator may illegally obtain another person's password and use it to access 
unauthorized files and this may occur through outsiders or combination of the employee and the outsiders using 
hardware processing and storage facilities for the illegal act. Also, staffs that have access to the systems, via, the 
new technologies make the financial system most  vulnerable to a wide variety of vandalism and fraud. 
Computerization itself  makes fraud easier to commit, harder to detect and exploitable by more  people than is 
possible through the paper and ledger system.  
For a successful fraudster, the rewards can be enormous and the risk of detection minimal. Hence, 
sophisticated computer wizards have ways of passing through lease telephone cables to gain access into database 
of computerized organizations. Once access is gained, information is distorted in favour of the fraudulent person. 
The end product might be a movement of big sums from known accounts to the fraudster's account 
3.2.2. Causes of Electronic Frauds in Banks  
Electronic fraud in a banking environment can among other things be  induced by any of the following:-  
(1) Inadequate supervision of staff  
(2) Unplanned acquisition of new technology computerization  
(3) Widespread application of automated systems which leaves no trace of handwriting nor physical documents 
that can be verified.  
(4) Frequent changes in computer technology.  
(5) Changes in data management and control procedures. 
(6) Inadequate training for the computer operators and their bosses.     
  
4. Malpractices by Banks 
Here, we are concerned with those malpractices which can be attributed to the official policies of a bank's 
management. In this section some broad 
Categories of malpractices shall be focused upon, namely; bursting of credit ceilings, illegal sales of 
foreign exchange round tripping of funds.  (i) Exceeding Credit Ceilings:- In Nigeria, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria
1
 imposes general credit ceiling on banks on the percentages of their operational funds they may lend out 
as loans. Within these limits, it then sets out guidelines for the sect oral allocations of such loan funds. In this 
regard, it is known that banks breach the Central Bank of Nigeria's Guidelines on sectoral allocations. Such 
breaches may be due to the quest for excessive profits namely: operating policies guidelines. Such activities must 
be classified as malpractices, properly so called. So should motivated bursting of the overall ceiling levels.  
(ii)  Illegal sales of Foreign Exchange: Banks are known to be Purchasing foreign exchange from 
independent sources in circumstances almost similar to what obtains in 'parallel' or the 'black' market. The banks 
then sell off such privately purchased foreign exchange to their customers at exorbitant rates. Another 
malpractice in this area is that the banks hoard their  officially purchased foreign exchange. They are able to 
account for their sales by entering into their sales the transactions involving their sales of the parallel market 
purchases. This then involves cooking up the books to reflect what was considered to be acceptable exchange 
sales rates, which do not often reflect the actual rates of exchange sales. The hoarded officially acquired foreign 
exchange is also sold at exorbitant rates, leading to exorbitant overall profits all round for the banks. Where any 
such malpractices have been discovered, the banks at fault would have been suspended from bidding at the next 
auction.  
(iii) Round Tripping of Funds:- This is the practice whereby a foreign bank would guarantee a local loan for a 
local project. Usually the foreign bank would be a corresponding bank or an affiliate of the local bank. The two 
banks would then enter into collusion and the following scenario would emerge. On the raising of the bank 
guarantee by the foreign bank to the Nigerian bank to back up an application to the Nigerian bank for a loan in 
naira for the execution of the project in Nigeria. The Nigerian bank would then decide to grant 
the loan. The project would subsequently be executed in Nigeria. All necessary foreign importation would be 
effected by the normal procedure of purchasing the required foreign exchange on the open foreign exchange 
market in Nigeria. Usually, during the execution or after the completion of the project, all the parties, namely the 
contractor or project proprietor, the Nigerian bank and the foreign bank would, in accordance with their initial 
conspiracy record the failure to execute or complete the project. The Nigerian bank would then formally call 
upon the foreign bank to remit the amount of the foreign exchange provided for in its guarantee to enable the 
completion of the project or reimbursement of itself.  
The foreign exchange so transferred would then be sold at exorbitant rates locally. After the deduction 
                                                           
1 Herein after  referred to as CBN 
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of its own profit locally, the remaining amount would  then be transmitted back to the foreign bank through the 
purchase of foreign exchange in the Nigerian market. All the parties to the conspiracy, banks and individuals 
concerned, would then share the remaining profit over and above the original sum guaranteed in foreign 
exchange. The issue here is that the involvement of the foreign bank in the form of a guarantee usually does not 
result in any actual foreign investment in the country.  
 Additionally, it operates to drain further the available scarce foreign and local resources. 
Consequently, this malpractice in effect, operates to reduce the amount of foreign exchange available to the 
country for the real investment for the development of the economy. Also, further depreciation of the naira at the 
time of the remittance of the money abroad would also result in the contraction of the amount of naira that would 
have been available for local investment in the Nigerian economy. Consequently, it was a welcome relief, even 
though somewhat belated, when the malpractice was abolished by circular Number 23, in April 1989. 
(iv) Interest Rate Policy: Item 9 of the central Bank of Nigeria Credit Policy Guidelines for 1990 fiscal year 
provides that banks shall pay interest on current accounts deposit, also that the rate of interest payable shall be 
subject to negotiation between banks and their customers. Research revealed that virtually all banks did their best 
to avoid paying interest on current accounts.
1
 The guidelines cited earlier further provides that banks shall 
continue to design their passbook in such a way that the following information will be clearly shown when 
calculating interest yield on savings deposits, interest rate applied, the amount of savings on which calculation is 
based and the period for which interest is calculated. Just as was the case with interest on current accounts, most 
banks flouted this directive 
(v) Forgeries: - The areas most vulnerable to fraud and forgeries are the procedures for granting, recording and 
monitoring of loans and advances to customers
2
. In Odu v The State
3
 and UBA v Ibhafidon
4
, what constitutes 
forgery under the Nigerian Criminal code arose. Nevertheless, looking at definition of the word 'forgery' in the 
dictionary, it means “an act of making or writing in fraudulent imitation”. The more generally acceptable 
definition of the word is "the act of falsifying or altering any writing for customer’s signature.
5
-. 
  
5. Causes of Frauds
6
  
The causes of frauds can be grouped into two classes - the institutional and   environmental/social factors. The 
institutional factors are those traceable to the  internal environment of the bank while the environmental social 
factors are those  which result from the influence of the environment/society on the banking  industry. 
 
5.1. Institutional Causes of Frauds:
7
  
Various authors and professionals in the industry have unanimously  identified the institutional causes of frauds 
to be:  
Volume of Work: The amount of work done by bank officials could be so too much that frauds could 
easily pass undetected by such officials.  
Number of Staff: Where an official supervises a large number of staff, there is a high likelihood that 
fraud could go undetected.  
Nature of Services: Frauds can be caused where documents of value and liquid assets are exposed to an 
indisciplined staff of unauthorized persons, for example, customers.  
Banking Experience to Staff: Frauds in banks occur with  higher frequency among staff with little 
experience and  knowledge of banking practice. Where professionally qualified bankers are involved in frauds, 
they are more likely to swindle larger sums of money than the less qualified staff.  
Staff Negligence: In many cases, staff negligence has led to frauds in banks. Negligence itself is a 
product of several factors, including poor supervision, lack of technical knowledge, apathy, etc.  
Inadequate Training of Staff:  Staffs are not given adequate training on how to easily detect frauds.  
Inadequate Infrastructure: Poor communications system,  power failure which result in a backlog of 
unbalanced posting, congested office space, etc also encourages the perpetration of bank frauds.  
Recruitment System: Poor recruitment system, where relevant technical knowledge, competence, 
character and other qualities are sacrificed at the altar of non-performance  related factors such as connections 
and nepotism, constitute  important facilitators of frauds in banks.  
Poor Management: Banks with poor management record  higher incidence of all sorts of frauds than 
those with effective  management. Poor management gives rise to ineffective and  poor control system and 
                                                           
1 I.J. Goldface- Irolikabe (2007) Op.Cit p.185 
2 Ibid at  p.179 
3 (1965) 1 A N. L. R. 25 (Sc).  
4 Supra footnote 5 
5 See B.O.N. v Maidamisa  (1997) 10 NWLR pg 408 at 424 
6 Esan Ogunleye Op.cit. 
7 Esan Ogunleye Op.cit. 
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indiscipline among staff thus  creating an environment for frauds to flourish. 
Poor Security Arrangement for Documents: In banks  where security arrangements for valuable 
documents are  weak, poor and vulnerable, it is easy for fraudsters to have  their way without detection.  
Frustration: When management practices negatives the aspiration and needs of staff it could result in frustration 
on the part of the  generality of staff. Frustration in turn breeds fraudulent practices in banks.  Delays in 
Operational Procedures: Delays in operational procedures create opportunities for hatching frauds in banks 
thus making prevention and early detection difficult. 
Use of Sophisticated Accounting Machines:  when sophisticated accounting machines are  in use and 
are manned by inadequately trained staff, errors could arise and thus lead to the production of incorrect records. 
These machines could be employed to deliberately omit entries, substitute improper calculation and to 
manipulate documents.  
 Lapses in the Management Control System of Corporate Customers: Here, fraudulent staff in both the 
banks and in the employment of the corporate customers could collude to take undue advantage of the lapses 
observed in the management control system of corporate customers.  
Negligence of Customers: It is the negligence on the part of customers that provides ample 
opportunities to bank staff to perpetrate fraud. 
 
5.2. Environmental and Social Causes of Fraud
1
  
Personality Profile of Fraudsters:  
Most individuals with inordinate ambition are prone to committing frauds.  Such individuals are bent on making 
money by hook or by crook. Such  people dismiss morality as an unnecessary prerequisite for virtuous life.To 
them, the end justifies the means they are usually unscrupulous and opportunistic.  
Lack of Effective Deterrent/Punishment: Although it may be considered a moot point, it is argued in 
some quarters that lack of effective deterrent such as heavy punishment could be a factor contributing to the 
perpetration of frauds in banks. 
Societal Values: The value system in any society is the set of rules that prescribes what is right or 
wrong within that society. It can be argued that the main causes of frauds in banks in Nigeria are traceable to the 
general dishonesty in the  society where morality is thrown to the dust bin. Misplacement of society values, the 
unquestioning attitude of the society towards unusual sources of  wealth etc are contributory factors to frauds in 
the country.  
Fear of Negative Publicity: Many banks fail to report fraud cases to the appropriate authorities as they 
believe that doing so will give unnecessary negative publicity to their banks.  This attitude encourages 
individuals with inordinate ambitions to defraud the banks. 
 
6. Legal Framework for Combating Banking Malpractices in Nigeria 
The main legal provision aimed at preventing the occurrence of Malpractices in the banking industry in Nigeria 
is the Banking and other Financial Institutions Act 1991. This is an Act designed to regulate the practices of 
banking industry in the country. By the terms of the provisions of the acts, one may be tempted to say that the 
banking sector is the most regulated sector of the nation’s economy. 
The Banks and Financial Institutions Act of 1991
2
 provide that every bank shall cause to be kept 
proper books of accounts with respect to all transactions of the bank.
3
 It provides that every bank shall submit to 
the bank not later than 28 days after the last days of each month or such interval as the bank may specify a 
statement showing the assets and liabilities of the bank and analysis of advances and other assets, at its head 
office and branches in and outside Nigeria in such form as the bank may specify from time to time.
4
 The Act
5
 If 
any person being a director, manager or officer of a bank (a) fails to take all reasonable steps to secure 
compliance with any of the provisions of this section;(b) has by his willful act been the cause of any default 
thereof by the bank, he is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction, in respect of paragraph (a) of this 
subsection, to a fine of N100,000 and in respect of paragraph (b) of this section to a fine of N50,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years 
The Act provides
6
 that any bank which fails to comply with any of the requirements of subsection (1) 
or(2) of this section is, in respect of each such failure, guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding 
N25,000 for each day during which the offence continues..
7
 S.27 BOFIA provides that subject to the prior 
                                                           
1 ibid 
2 hereinafter referred to as BOFIA in the paper 
3 S.24(1)   
4 S.25(1)18 
5 S.24(5) 
6 S.25(3) 
7 See Akanle Oluwole.(1985) “Developments in Commercial Business and Trade Laws” in Aguda (ed) The Challenge of the 
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approval in writing of the bank, a bank shall not later than 4 months after the ends of its financial year forward to 
the Central bank copies of balance sheets and profit and loss accounts duly signed and contained the full and 
correct names of the directors of the bank. S.27(5) Any bank which fails to comply with any of the requirements 
of this section is in respect of each such failure guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine of N10,000 
each day during which the offence continues 
Furthermore, bank examiners supervisors are appointed pursuant to S.30 of the ActS.30(1) provides 
that there shall be an officer of the bank who shall be appointed by the Governor to be known as the Director of 
Banking Supervision or by such other titles as the Governor may specify. S.30 (3) & (4) provides respectively 
that the Governor shall appoint to assist the Director of Banking Supervision such other officers of bank as the 
Governor may from time to time decide. The officers may be designated examiners or have such titles as the 
Governor may specify. S.31(7) provides that every bank shall produce to the examiners at such times as the  
examiners may specify all books, accounts, documents and information which they may require. 
S.31 (8) provides for appropriate penalties if any book, document or information is not produced in 
accordance with the requirement of an examination under this section. It states that if any book, document or 
information is not produced in accordance with the requirement of an examiner under this section or what is 
produced or furnished to 
an examiner is false in any material particular, the bank is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction 
to a fine of N100,000 and in addition, to a fine of N10,000 for each day during which the offence continues 
All these provisions have been put in place so that banks do not furnish  false statements or keep 
incorrect books of account. The purpose of such  examination is to enable detection of any malpractice that may 
have occurred.
1
  
Apart from the regular examination in the activities and operations of a bank under specified 
conditions as when : 
(a) The Governor has reason to believe that the business of the bank is being conducted in a manner detrimental 
to the interest of its depositors or creditors, contravening the provisions of the Decree or has insufficient assets to 
cover its obligations; or  
(b) there is request by a specially weighted majority of its shareholders, or  
(c) it suspends payments. Where the findings of a special examination reveal any of the preceding circumstance, 
the Governor may take a variety of actions or decisions, from ordering the bank to take certain steps to the 
revocation of license. 
In order to keep a watchful eye on the financial circumstances of bank officials, the Bank Employees, 
etc. (Declaration of Assets) Act 1986 was enacted: The Act provides that every bank official should on taking up 
appointment declare his asset. This is to be updated on a regular basis and in the event of his leaving the bank, he 
is also required to declare his assets.  The purpose of this is to be able to determine the legitimate earnings of a 
bank official and thereby place an onus on him to establish how he came about any excess. Income that cannot 
be accounted for from his legitimate sources.
2
 S.7 of the above law
3
 makes it an offence punishable with 10 
years imprisonment for any employee of a bank to own assets in excess of his legitimate known and provable 
income and assets. In addition to imprisonment, such employee shall be liable to forfeit the excess assets or its 
equivalent in money. Furthermore, the Act
4
 makes it an offence for any person to act as a front for any bank 
employee. The offence is 'punishable with 7 years imprisonment and the asset in question forfeited to the states.  
The criminal code
5
 provides for the offences of stealing, cheating, corrupt acceptance of gift, forgery, fraudulent, 
false accounting etc. Various terms of imprisonment are provided, ranging from two to fourteen years for 
anybody found guilty of any of these offences in addition or in the alternative to imprisonment, the offender may 
be ordered to pay a fine usually less than Nl, 000. In 1979 also, as an answer to the then prevalent practice of 
issuing dud cheques for services rendered, the Dishonoured cheques (offences) Act
6
, was enacted. The Act 
punishes any person who obtains credit for himself or any other person by means of a cheque which is 
subsequently dishonored. The offender, if an individual, is liable to two years imprisonment without an option of 
fine body, to a fine of not less than N5, 000.  The Money Laundering Act of 1985 has also criminalized money 
laundering in Nigeria 
Exchange control laws and regulations play prominent part in National financial policy execution, and 
are of overwhelming importance in controlling international financial transaction. Capital flows from one 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Nigerian Nation: An examination of its Legal Development. 1960-85 ,Lagos 
1Akanle Oluwole, (1990) “Legal Control and Prevention of Crimes in the Banking Industry” in Banking 
and other Financial Malpractices in Nigeria (ed.), Abuja: Federal Ministry of Justice Law Series. 
2 Declaration of Assets) Decree 1986. 
3 Oluwole Akanle Opcit.  
4 Declaration of Assets) Decree 1986 
5 Criminal code of Nigeria 
6 Dishonoured Cheques (offences) Act NO 44 of 1977 
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country to another affect both the country which is investing the Capital or lending it, and the which is 
borrowing the Capital or where it is being invested:- such free flow of capital tends to inhibit the ability of 
government to pursue an Independent monetary policy, and may also impawn its economic sovereignty. This is 
so because the free flow of funds affects a country’s balance of payments, internal liquidity, and consequently, 
money supply and inflation. Such free flow of funds may also have the unpleasant effect of diverting in to 
foreign and other unauthorized hands those savings in foreign currency which may otherwise be available for 
domestic investments. 
Exchange control Act 1962,
1
 makes comprehensive provisions for exchange control by conferring 
fines in relation to currency, payments, securities, debts transfer and settlement of property, and for other 
purposes involving foreign exchange transactions.  
 Exchange Control Anti-Sabotage Act 1984
2
 made revolutionary amendments to the exchange Control 
Act 1962, and introduced the establishments of special tribunals to try offences arising there under, and makes 
anyone convicted to suffer stiff penalties.  
Foreign Currency (Domiciliary Accounts) Act of 1985
3
 in S.1 (2) provides that citizens of Nigeria, 
aliens resident in Nigeria, bodies corporate and Un-incorporated registered under the relevant laws operative in 
Nigeria, foreign diplomatic and Consular missions and International organizations and such other persons as the 
armed forces ruling council (AFRC) may from time to time designate, and operate Foreign Domiciliary 
Accounts) in the foreign currencies designated . The operation of the account could be by bank drafts mail or 
telegraphic transfers' but anyone who wishes to operate and make deposits into the account other than by any of 
these modes of operation, may produce evidence of importation of the currency or a declaration in the prescribed 
form. The Act empowers the C.B.N. in its normal course of duties to control and supervise the general 
operations of the provisions of the Act while S.6 of the Act provides stiff penalties for unauthorized dealers or 
forgers, or whosoever defrauds, in the process of operating the accounts. One cannot readily notice any omission 
or shortcomings in the Act to facilitate foreign exchange malpractice, though one cannot rule out subversion of 
some of its provisions 
Bills of Exchange Act (Cap 21) 1988
30
 is the law codifying the rules and comrnercial practices relating 
to bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes. The provisions of the Act have stood the test of time, and it 
does not appear there is any shortcomings which have not been rectified up to date, to any foreign exchange 
malpractices.  
 SFEM Act 1986
31
as an Act seeks to establish and bring order in the second-tier foreign exchange 
market and ensure that transactions conducted in the market pass the test of integrity and probity. Exchange of 
capital laws and regulations play prominent part in National financial policy execution, and are of overwhelming 
importance in controlling international financial transactions.  
 
7. Suggested Reforms. 
(1) All the existing penal provisions mentioned in this paper relating to banking malpractices should be over 
hauled with a view to their modernization.  
(2)Committees should be set up or commissioned specifically for the purpose of carrying out the exercise in (1) 
above in particular, the committee or group should be required to: 
(a) examine the types and scope of existing offences and relate these to existing malpractices, with a view to 
suggesting the creation of new offences where desirable or the expansion or modification of existing ones.  
(b) examine existing penalties prescribed for the offences and determine their adequacy or otherwise bearing in 
mind the cost/benefit effect of punishment on the criminal. In this respect, consideration should be given to the 
imposition of fines which could be a multiplier of the amount involved in the malpractice and, in any case, with 
a guaranteed minimum.  
(3) The police and the law enforcement agencies should be more equipped for the task of combating banking 
malpractices as discussed in this paper, they should also collaborate on crime investigations. Nigeria law 
enforcement agencies can also team up with law enforcement agencies of other countries in actualizing this  
(4) More Special Economic Crime Unit should be set up in Nigeria in respect of banking activities and business 
which will be responsible for the investigation of all banking malpractices, the gathering, collation and 
dissemination of intelligence information on bank criminals and their methods and the administration of the 
various laws enacted. 
(5) All the Special Economic Crime Unit in Nigeria should have all of its personnel well qualified and trained in 
the modern methods of detection and investigation of economic crimes. As regards this it may retain the services 
of seasoned accountants, computer experts and other specialists. Furthermore, prosecutions of banking 
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malpractices and other economic crimes should be undertaken by a specialist group of legal officers. 
(6) There should be frequent exchanges of training programme and seminars for all law enforcement agencies on 
means of combating banking malpractices. 
(7) In combating electronic fraud there is need to evolve a cost effective strategy that will facilitate the control of 
electronic frauds.  Apart from policies available on electronic banking in Nigeria, there is also a need for a viable 
legal framework on electronic banking in Nigeria that will eradicate the treat the system have posed to people 
overtime. 
(8) There is a need for putting in effective  internal control mechanisms that can check Electronic Banking 
abuses. The  Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales defined Internal  Controls as "the whole 
system of control financial and otherwise established  by management in order to carry on the business of the 
company in an  orderly and efficient manner, safeguard its assets and secure as much as possible the 
completeness of records 
(9)  There should be a total reorientation of citizens of the country on issues of corruption/ banking malpractices. 
If the leaders of the country could also lead by example and transparently in that regard  then the problem will be 
nipped in the bud. 
 
7. Conclusion  
The prevention, detection and punishment of economic crimes especially banking malpractices is highly 
essential. Banking malpractices causes economic set-back for any nation in which it is prevalent.  When Banking 
malpractices come to a peak people will loose confidence in using banking and negotiable instruments for 
carrying out contractual and other obligations. Such loss of confidence then causes a slowdown of the local 
economy and raises suspicion internationally in commercial and economic circles. Instruments of international 
commerce like letters of credit, bank drafts, bills of exchange emanating from local banks will then be subjected 
to serious scrutiny and suspected as fake abroad. Nigeria and other nations of the world of the world should 
therefore join hands in combating this evil. Jurisdictions around the world should all put in place strong and 
effective  anti-banking malpractices regimes at the domestic level. International cooperation is equally important 
in fighting these banking malpractices. There must be at all times close collaborations between the  different 
countries of the world.  
Nigeria and Countries of the world should therefore not relent in the fight against  banking 
malpractices so that the Banking sector which constitutes a major pillar  on which the economies of the nations 
of the world are erected will not be  destroyed.  The suggestions offered in this paper are very instructive in this 
regard. 
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